Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information for Secondary Base Stations in Cognitive Radio Networks
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26636/jtit.2013.3.1230Keywords:
Bayesian equilibrium, cognitive radio networks, game theory, wireless communicationAbstract
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to be an effective solution for enhancing overall spectrum efficiency. Using CR technology fully involves the providing of incentives to Primary Radio Networks (PRNs) and revenue to the service provider so that Secondary Base Stations (SBSs) may utilize PRN spectrum bands accordingly. In this paper, a cooperative games with incomplete information for SBSs in a CR network is presented. Each SBS can cooperate with neighboring SBSs in order to improve its view of the spectrum. Moreover, proposed game-theory models assume that the devices have incomplete information about their components, meaning that some players do not completely know the structure of the game. Using the proposed algorithm, each SBS can leave or join the coalition while maximizing its overall utility. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed algorithm allows us to reduce the average payoff per SBS up to 140% relative to a CR network without cooperation among SBSs.
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