Security Verification in the Context of 5G Sensor Networks

Abstract

In order to develop reliable safety standards for 5G sensor networks (SN) and the Internet of Things, appropriate verification tools are needed, including those offering the ability to perform automated symbolic analysis process. The Tamarin prover is one of such software-based solutions. It allows to formally prove security protocols. This paper shows the modus operandi of the tool in question. Its application has been illustrated using an example of an exchange of messages between two agents, with asynchronous encryption. The scheme may be implemented, for instance, in the TLS/DTLS protocol to create a secure cryptographic key exchange mechanism. The aim of the publication is to demonstrate that automated symbolic analysis may be relied upon to model 5G sensor networks security protocols. Also, a use case in which the process of modeling the DTLS 1.2 handshake protocol enriched with the TCP SYN Cookies mechanism, used to preventing DoS attacks, is presented