Anonymous Stateless Communication Architecture: Design, Network Performance Analysis, and Integration of Tor Hidden Services for Privileged Communications

Abstract

This paper presents the network architecture and empirical performance analysis of the Proof of Concept (POC) for a stateless Tor-based communication system designed for privileged communication. Unlike existing secure messaging platforms relying on centralized server infrastructures, persistent session states, or identifiable network endpoints, the proposed solution achieves server-side and client anonymity simultaneously through the integration of Tor hidden services v3, stateless application design, and containerized microservice decomposition. We formally describe the system's model and its constituent components: an application server, an ephemeral identity registry, and a browser-based client operating over WebCrypto. Next, we analyze performance of the network layer across 100 measurement cycles. Empirical results confirm that cryptographic operations contribute less than 2 ms of overhead relative to dominant Tor circuit latency (mean value of 8100 ms per circuit). Immunity to traffic, session linkability, and server deanonymization are examined against a realistic network adversary model. POC is compared to SecureDrop, Ricochet, and Signal in terms of five architectural properties and is shown to be the only system under evaluation satisfying all five requirements simultaneously. Deployment considerations for production-grade privileged communication environments, including operational security procedures for public key registration, are discussed as well.