Pricing Rules Comparison in the Context of Bandwidth Trade

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26636/jtit.2010.2.1073

Keywords:

communication bandwidth trade, mechanism design, pricing rule

Abstract

In this paper we compare two pricing rules in the context of bandwidth trade. Allocation and pricing rules, together with a set of signals received from independent agents, constitute a market mechanism. In the paper we analyze two pricing rules: well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule (VCG) and the parametric pricing rule (PPR). We apply these pricing rules to the allocation rule specified by the balancing communication bandwidth trade model (BCBT).

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Submitted

2023-06-27

Published

2010-06-30

Issue

No. 2 (2010)

Section

ARTICLES FROM THIS ISSUE

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Copyright (c) 2023 Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

[1]
P. Pałka and E. Toczyłowski, “Pricing Rules Comparison in the Context of Bandwidth Trade”, JTIT, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 61–66, Jun. 2010, doi: 10.26636/jtit.2010.2.1073.

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